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bers of the bar who have occasion to draft instruments intended as perpetual leases should heed the court's advice.
The question of what a lessee is legally bound to preserve was the
principal issue in Powell v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.3 Defendant leased certain premises from plaintiff and operated a gasoline station upon them.
This was a nonconforming use, which fact was known to both plaintiff
and defendant. For a time defendant operated the station, then abandoned all operations but continued to pay the rent for several years. The
city where the premises were located, Washington Court House, had a
zoning ordinance in effect, which in substance provided that if a nonconforming use was not utilized for more than one year, the use was
thereby terminated and could not be revived.
Plaintiff in his second cause of action sought damages for defendant's
alleged failure to operate the station, thereby causing him to lose the
use of the property for commercial purposes under the zoning ordinance.
The court held that, under the terms of the lease, the defendant was
not bound to operate the gasoline station. Because it was not bound to
preserve this nonconforming use, it could not be held liable for damages.
The court did mention that although the lease provided that the tenant
would comply with, inter alia, all ordinances relating to health, and that
the ordinance discussed above was "for the promotion of public health,"
the failure to operate the station did not constitute noncompliance with
the city ordinance. This would certainly be a logical conclusion, for to
require a party to maintain a nonconforming use to comply with an ordinance whose obvious purpose was to reduce such uses would be contradictory to reason and the intent of the ordinance.
JOHN

H. WILHARM,

JR.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
HOME RULE

Licensing by Municipalities
Nature of a License
The City of Akron owned in fee the land underlying two artificial
reservoirs outside the city limits. These reservoirs were built by damming non-navigable streams and were used to supply the city water works.
The city undertook to devote these reservoirs to recreational purposes and
3.

113 Ohio App. 507, 179 N.E.2d 82 (1960).
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to permit boating and fishing on their waters. In order to raise revenues
to this end,' the city required that a "permission of license" be obtained
for the privilege of operating water craft on the reservoir waters. The
Ohio Attorney General sought to enjoin the City of Akron from requiring
a separate boat license for this privilege.
In State ex rel. McElroy v. City of Akron2 the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed the lower court decisions, which had sustained the city's power to
license, and granted the injunction. The court held that the license was a
tax because its purpose was the production of revenue and that the state
had pre-empted the power to tax watercraft on waters of the state by the
enactment of Ohio Revised Code sections 1547.54 and 1547.61. 8 The
opinion of the court sought to delineate what the city could and could
not do as the owner of these reservoirs: The city could preclude anyone,
including those who held watercraft licenses issued by the state, from using its waters; the city could charge admission fees for access to the reservoir waters or for the use of the city ramps and docks; however, the city
could not license the privilege of operating watercraft upon its waters.4
The court did not make a distinction in this case between a license
granted by a municipality to a third party for the privilege of using and
enjoying the municipality's property, and a license granted by a municipality to a third party as a condition precedent to the full use and enjoyment of the third party's property. Under prior Ohio case law, a municipality which has an interest in property retains the same rights and duties
in relation to that property as does any private owner.5 Further, under
Ohio case law, the owner of the fee underlying a body of water created by
the damming of a non-navigable stream has the exclusive right to use the
waters above the land for boating and fishing.' This exclusive right
1. The city claimed that it was precluded by its charter and by state statute from devoting
either water department funds or general tax revenues for the maintenance and supervision
of the recreational area. See State ex rel. McElroy v. City of Akron, 168 N.E.2d 500, 502
(Ohio C.P. 1960).
2. 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 35 (1962).
3. OHto REV. CODE § 1547.54 requires owners of watercraft operated on waters of the state
to apply for a state license. OHto Rnv. CODE § 1547.61 provides in part: "No political
subdivision of this state or conservancy district shall charge any license fee or other charge
against the owner of any watercraft for the right or privilege of operating said watercraft
upon the waters of any such political subdivision or conservancy district and no license or
number in addition to those provided for hereunder shall be required by any state department,
conservancy district, or political subdivision of this state." In the City of Akron case the court
construed this prohibition not only as applying to waters located in political subdivisions but
also as applying to non-navigable waters in which the political subdivision held an important

property interest.
4. State ex rel. McElroy v. City of Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 195-96, 181 N.E.2d 26, 31
(1962).
5. State ex rel. White v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 230, 181 N.E. 24 (1932).
6. Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890); Akron, Canal & Hydraulic Co.
v. Fontaine, 72 Ohio App. 93, 50 N.E.2d 897 (1943).
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necessarily entails the right to grant someone else a license for some special use and enjoyment of the property.7
Licensing as a Police Regulation
Prior to 1962, municipalities had little success in regulating liquor
establishments.8 However, the power of municipalities to license business
establishments operating under state licenses was upheld in Stary v.City
of Brooklyn,' decided in 1954.
In Auxter v. City of Toledo'" the owner of a beer and wine carry-out
store brought an action to enjoin the City of Toledo from collecting its
fifteen dollar license fee under the Toledo liquor licensing ordinance. In
reversing the lower court decision which had sustained the ordinance as
valid, the supreme court determined the ordinance to be a police regulation because it prohibited "the doing of something without a municipal
license to do it,"" and held that under the Sokol 2 test, the regulation was
in conflict with state law:
In the instant case, the ordinance forbids and prohibits what the
statute permits and licenses. Even though plaintiff has a state license
authorizing him to carry on the business of selling beer in Toledo, the
ordinance prohibits him from doing so if he does not pay for and secure
a municipal license to do so.'3

By limiting and distinguishing the holding in Stary, the court in Auxter
placed in serious doubt all types of municipal regulatory licensing where
there exists a state regulatory license for the same business operation. 4
7. The court's decision is not one which will encourage municipalities to dedicate their water
supply and flood control reservoirs to recreational uses, despite a lengthy discussion in the
court's opinion of the rapidly increasing number of boat owners in the state and the need for
more boating and fishing areas.
8. See, e.g., Neil House v. City of Columbus, 144 Ohio St. 248, 58 N.E.2d 655 (1944)
(invalidating a midnight closing ordinance); Spisak v. Village of Solon, 68 Ohio App. 290,
39 N.E.2d 531 (1941) (invalidating liquor licensing ordinance).
9. 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954). The ordinance which was upheld required
trailer camp operators to obtain a municipal license and provided for revocation of the license
if any trailer were permitted to remain in the camp more than ninety consecutive days. Licensing by the State Board of Health was provided for in OHIO GEN. CODE § 1235-3, now
OHIO REv. CODE § 3733.04.
Syllabus 3 of the opinion in Stary states: "A provision in
a municipal ordinance requiring the operator of such camp or park to pay to the municipality a license fee which is reasonably related to the expense of supervision of the camp or park_
and the enforcement of the ordinance is not in conflict with § 1235-3, General Code ...
10. 173 Ohio St. 444, 183 N.E.2d 920 (1962).
11. Id. at 446, 183 N.E.2d at 922.
12. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 (1923).
13. Auxter v. City of Toledo, 173 Ohio St. 444, 447, 183 N.E.2d 920, 923 (1962) (All
italicized in original.).
14. The court suggested that Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E.2d 11
(1954), could be distinguished on the basis that a housing regulation rather than a liquor
regulation was under consideration. Another possible distinction between Auxter and Stary
which was not suggested by the court is that in Auxter the statute provided that "each permit
issued . . . shall authorize the person named to carry on the business specified" whereas in
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In City of Wooster v. Gentile5 defendants appealed from a conviction for failure to obtain a peddler's and solicitor's license as required by
municipal ordinance. The Wayne County Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction and held that while municipalities are authorized by state statute to adopt ordinances licensing peddlers, such ordinances, if they are
not to be deemed in conflict with state law, must contain the same exemptions and exceptions as provided under state law. 6
Since the state statute does not itself regulate peddlers and solicitors
but purports only to authorize and limit municipal regulation in this area,
the case raises the question whether a municipal regulation which extends
beyond the limits imposed by the state statute is in conflict with the statute." The Gentile case also suggests, but does not raise, another "conflict" problem: Whether the "conflict" issue may be invoked by a person
who does not come within the particular provisions of a municipal ordinance which on their face are at variance with the state statute."
Penaltiesunder Ordinances
In City of Cleveland v. Betts"0 the supreme court held that a municipal ordinance which defined a certain offense as a misdemeanor is in conflict with a state statute which defines the same offense as a felony, and
the ordinance is, therefore, invalid. 0
Stary the statute contained no such provision. Thus an argument could be made that the
statute expressly permitted the holder of a state liquor permit to operate his business without
a municipal license.
15. 116 Ohio App. 386, 188 N.E.2d 172 (1962).
16. OHIo REV. CODE §§ 715.63 & 715.64 purport to authorize municipalities to adopt
ordinances licensing peddlers and transient dealers. OHIO REV. CODE § 715.63 provides in
part: "No municipal corporation may require of the owner of any product of his own raising,
or the manufacturer of any article manufactured by him, a license to vend or sell, by himself
or his agent, any such article or product." Oluo REV. CODE § 715.64 provides in part:
'This section does not apply to persons selling by sample only, nor to any agricultural articles
or products offered or exposed for sale by a producer."
17. See City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917) (statute prohibiting municipal speeding regulations unconstitutional); but cf. Schneiderman v. Sesantein,
121 Ohio St. 80, 167 NE. 158 (1929).
18. The facts of the opinion do not reveal whether defendants had manufactured or raised
the products they were selling and/or whether they were merely selling samples so that they
might come within the statutory exceptions.
19. 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958). For a criticism of the Betts rule, see FARRELL-.ELLIs, Omo MUNIcIPAL CODE § 1.33 (11th ed. 1962).

20. Two cases reported in 1962 and decided under the Betts rule involved municipal ordinances deemed to be in conflict with OHIO REv. CODE § 2905.34, which declares a sale, or the
like, of obscene materials or contraceptives to be a felony. In City of Cincinnati v. Coy, 115
Ohio App. 478, 172 N.E.2d 268 (1962), the city unsuccessfully contended that the requirement of scienter in the ordinance was not the same as the requirement in the statute as construed and that, therefore, the ordinance did not fall within the Betts rule. In Hicks v. City
of Akron, 181 N.F-2d 279 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961), a declaratory judgment action, the operator
of vending machines which dispensed prophylactics, successfully attacked a municipal penal
ordinance prohibiting distribution of contraceptives except by physicians and druggists as in
conflict with Orno REv. CODE § 2905.34.
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In City of Toledo v.Best21 the supreme court held that an ordinance
which prescribed a certain penalty for a misdemeanor is not in conflict
with a state statute which prescribed a greater penalty for the same offense so long as the penalty prescribed in the state statute does not classify
the offense as a felony.
In 1962 the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals added a further refinement to these rules. Under the court's holding in City of Cleveland
V.Jones,22 an ordinance which provides a misdemeanor punishment for a
certain offense is not in conflict with a state statute which provides for
the same offense a misdemeanor punishment upon the first conviction
and for a felony punishment upon subsequent convictions. Apparently,
the prosecution under the ordinance was for a first offense. Would a
prosecution under the ordinance for a second offense render the ordinance
in conflict with the state statute?
Adoption of Municipal Ordinances
In Davis v. City of Willoughby28 the charter drafters included a provision that
any ordinance or resolution may be passed or adopted .. .by the af-

firmative votes of four members of the council unless a larger number
24
be required by the provisions of this charter or by the laws of Ohio.
Five members of a seven man council voted to adopt a resolution of
necessity for a sewer improvement to be paid for by special assessments.
In a taxpayer's action to enjoin the levy of a special assessment, the Ohio
Supreme Court declared the assessment invalid because the resolution of
necessity for the improvement was not adopted with three-fourths of the
council "members elected thereof concurring" as required by Ohio Revised
Code section 727.09.25
21. 172 Ohio St. 371, 176 N.E.2d 520 (1961); contra, City of Toledo v. Ransom, 169
N.E.2d 657 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
22. 184 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
23. 173 Ohio St. 338, 182 N.E.2d 552 (1962).
24. WILLOUGHBY CITY CHARTER, art. III, § 6 (Emphasis added.).

25.

A main argument raised by the city was that the failure of the president of council, act-

ing as mayor at the council meeting, to vote was an expression of his acquiescence and concurrence, and that in this way the requisite three-fourths majority was attained. See Babyak
v. Alten, 106 Ohio App. 191, 154 N.E.2d 14 (1958). The supreme court, looking to the
word, "concurring," in the language of the statute, rejected this argument: "The theory that
inaction by members of a city council should be considered as an acquiescence and approval
of the action taken by the majority of the members voting is not applicable in a proceeding
to levy and collect assessments for a public impiovement." Davis v. City of Willoughby, 173

Ohio St. 338, 343-44, 182 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1962).
For another case involving the procedure for adopting an ordinance by a charter municipality, see City of Dayton v. Woodgeard, 116 Ohio App. 248, 187 N.E.2d 921 (1962). In
this case an ordinance enacted by a charter municipality was declared valid even though the
ordinance was not enacted in compliance with the rules of the legislative body.
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0 the legislative body of
In State ex rel. Tester v. Board of Elections"
a non-charter municipality, upon the filing of a referendum petition, repealed the ordinance subject to the referendum and enacted a second
ordinance substantially the same as the first ordinance except that it contained an emergency recital. This procedural maneuver to avoid a referendum on the merits of the ordinance was held to be valid:

However, our law recognizes the right of a municipal council to
defeat the right to a referendum on legislation by enacting such legislation as an emergency measure; and we have held that the question of
whether there was an emergency is not subject to review in the courts
if council has, by the required vote, determined that there was an
emergency2 7
CHARTER MUNICIPALITIES

Compelling a Municipal Legislative Body to Act under Its Charter
Ohio courts have frequently invalidated acts of municipalities because these acts were not carried out in the manner required by the municipal charter.2 8 In State ex rel. Scott v. Masterson 9 the supreme court
went a step further and granted a writ of mandamus compelling a municipal legislative body to act under its charter when the manner of acting
was left wholly to the discretion of the legislative body.
Section 25 of the Charter of the City of Cleveland places the duty on
city council to redivide the city after each federal census into thirty-three
wards "as nearly equal in population as may be, composed of contiguous
and compact territory, and bounded by natural boundaries or street lines."
The Cleveland City Council had failed to redivide the wards according to
changes in population density reported in the 1950 and the 1960 federal
census. In issuing a writ of mandamus ordering council to redistrict, the
court looked with approval to the recent Tennessee reapportionment ruling by the United States Supreme Court."
26.

174 Ohio St. 15, 185 N.E.2d 726 (1962).
27. Id. at 17, 185 N.E.2d at 763.
28. In two Ohio cases reported in 1962, municipal contracts were invalidated because the
contracts were entered into without following the charter provisions for competitive bidding.
Young v. City of Dayton, 116 Ohio App. 271, 188 N.E.2d 166 (1962) (Dayton charter);
Revco v. City of Cleveland, 183 N.E.2d 646 (Ohio C.P. 1961) (Cleveland charter). In both
these cases, since the municipal obligation under its contract was a debt, the competitive
bidding provisions of Omo REv. CODs § 735.05 applied. See Phillips v. Hume, 122 Ohio
St 11, 170 N.E. 438 (1930).
29. 173 Ohio St. 402, 183 N.E.2d 376 (1962).
30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
On January 14, 1963, the Cleveland City Council adopted a redistricting ordinance which
recited the mandate of the Supreme Court. Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 118-63, Jan. 14,
1963.
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Distribution of Power by Municipal Charters
Generally, Ohio courts have sustained charter provisions which redistributed the function and offices of the municipal executive or which
have provided different procedures for the appointment of an executive
official from those provided in the state statutes. Further, the Ohio courts
have held that in the realm of the organization of a municipality the
charter is supreme and is not affected by state constitutional limitations.3
From this, some municipal lawyers have concluded that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not apply to charter municipalities.32
In City of Avon Lake v. Burke3 the municipality attempted to prosecute defendant for violation of a regulation of the Board of Municipal
Utilities which provided that the tampering with any water valve was a misdemeanor punishable by a one-hundred dollar fine. The municipal charter delegated to the board the power to make regulations relating to the
"safe, economical and efficient management, operation and protection"
of the public utility and provided that such regulations shall have "the
same validity as municipal ordinances." 4 The Avon Lake Municipal
Court, on its own motion, dismissed the prosecution and held that insofar
as the regulation attempted "to determine certain acts as misdemeanors
it is repugnant to the constitution of the State of Ohio."35 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded holding that the doctrine of the separation
of powers did not apply because the delegation of power came from the
charter itself and not from another legislative body which did not have
the power to delegate. 6
31. State ex rel. Hackley v. Edmonds, 150 Ohio St. 203, 80 N.E. 769 (1948) (charter
provision for recall of councilmen alleged in conflict with OHIO CoNsT. art. II, § 38); State
ex rel. Taylor v. French, 96 Ohio St. 172, 117 N.E. 173 (1917) (charter provision permitting women to hold municipal office alleged in conflict with OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1);
Fitzgerald v. City of Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 103 N.E. 512 (1913) (charter provision
abolishing nomination of municipal officer by partisan primary alleged in conflict with OHIO
CONST. art. V, § 7).
32. FARRELL-ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE, § 1.13 (11th ed. 1962); Duffey, Non-Charter
Municipalities: Local Self-Government, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 304, 310 (1960).
33. 115 Ohio App. 541, 186 N.E.2d 94 (1962), reversing 180 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio Munic.
Ct. 1962).
34. AVON LAKE CITY CHARTER, § 51.
35. City of Avon lake v. Burke, 180 N.E.2d 645, 646 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1962).
The
holding by the municipal court that the regulation was invalid was based both on the doctrine
of separation of powers and the due process requirement that certain formalities be observed
in enacting penal regulations.
36. The court of appeals stated regarding its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by the state
from a judgment by the municipal court dismissing a complaint: "We entertain this appeal
of the City of Avon Lake by virtue of the jurisdiction given this court under the Constitution
of Ohio, as well as on authority of cases cited in 2 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE (2D), Appellate
Review § 179." City of Avon Lake v. Burke, 115 Ohio App. 541, 543, 186 N.E.2d 94, 95
(1962).
At least one other home rule case in 1962 was decided in favor of the city on an appeal
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RELATIONS BETWEEN MUNICIPALITIES

Eminent Domain
In Village of Blue Ash v.City of Cincinnati37 the general home rule
power granted to municipalities under article XVIII, section 3 of the Ohio
Constitution collided with the home rule public utility power granted to
municipalities under article XVIII, section 4.
The City of Cincinnati had drawn up plans to construct a feeder-type
airport outside the city limits and had spent millions of dollars in acquiring property for this purpose. The city filed an action to condemn one
of the public streets of the Village of Blue Ash, which action the village
sought to enjoin. The trial court entered a decree enjoining Cincinnati
from condemning the street after the court had sustained a demurrer to
the answer of the city, and Cincinnati dedined to amend its answer.3 "
Cincinnati's view of the facts of the case as summarized by its law director was as follows:
Because of the high landing and takeoff speeds of modem aircraft,
modern airports must be large enough to provide runways in excess of
8,000 feet in length. Because of the fact that most cities that require
the services of airports are densely populated, it is necessary, from an
economic point of view, to locate such airports in the areas outside the
city which are sparsely populated. In the sparsely populated areas it is
impossible, because of the length of the runways required, to construct

an airport without acquiring in some manner, either by appropriation or

vacation, parts of existing street systems. If the streets cannot be va-

cated then they must be appropriated or there can be no airport. It
might be said, with respect to such a case, that the city should locate
its airport in an unincorporated area. The facts of the Cincinnati case
are, and this would probably be true of many other cases, that the area
in which the airport is located was unincorporated at the time the city
by the city from a judgment in the municipal court dismissing the prosecution. City of
Cleveland v. Jones, 184 NXE.2d 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), discussed at 454, supra.
These holdings have been discredited by City of Toledo v. Crews, 174 Ohio St. 253, 188
N.E.2d 592 (1963). The Crews case involved an appeal by the city from the municipal court
to the court of appeals following the municipal court's sustaining defendant's demurrer on
the grounds that the municipal ordinance under which defendant was charged was in conflict
with a state statute and therefore unconstitutional. The supreme court held that under the
existing statutes "there is no right of appeal in a criminal case involving a charge of violation
of a municipal ordinance except from a judgment of conviction." Id. at 256, 188 N.E.2d
at 594.
37. 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 NXE.2d 557 (1962).
38. Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 166 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
Behind the immediate issue before the courts in this case, the power of one municipality
to condemn another municipality's street, was perhaps even a more basic issue, the power of
one municipality to condemn and exercise exclusive and unrestricted control over property
within the limits of another municipality. This issue was initially raised at the trial level by
the city's allegation in its answer that the village sought by a zoning ordinance to prohibit
construction of airport runways in excess of 3,000 feet. For a full discussion of this problem
in another state, see Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 SY.2d 190 (1940).
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began the airport project and that the incorporation was effected pri-

marily for the purpose of blocking the airport. 3 9

Cincinnati sought to show that the facts in this case brought it within an exception to the general rule which prohibits the appropriation of
property already devoted to a public purpose. The general rule does not
apply, the city maintained, where there is either express or implied authority to condemn property of another public body. The authority to condemn was necessarily implied from the constitutional grant under article
XVIII, section 4, because of the paramount necessity for acquiring additional property in order to complete the airport project.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in effect, held the city's argument to be
correct as a proposition of law.4" However, the court also held that the
facts of this case did not warrant a finding of necessarily implied authority to condemn public property. The court, therefore, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court
which had granted the injunction.4
The court held as a matter of law that the power to condemn in this
case did not arise by necessary implication. The majority opinion stated
that a municipality acting in its proprietary capacity cannot condemn
property used by other municipalities in the performance of a governmental function."
Further, the opinion stated that in order to find
power implied by necessity, the "necessity must arise from the nature of
things over which the corporation desiring to take has no control, and
not from a necessity created by such corporation for its convenience or
economy."'
Finally, the court added that an injunction against an unauFarrell, Municipal Public Utility Powers, 21 OIO ST. L.J. 390, 397-98 (1960). For
the competing policy argument, see Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St.
345, 352, 182 N.E.2d 557, 562 (1962): "This case must be controlled by legal principles
and not by considering the practical effect of an airport for the city of Cincinnati at the expense of a public street in the village of Blue Ash. Each are municipal corporations, and if
property of one, devoted to governmental uses, can be taken by the other for an airport, while
acting in its proprietary capacity, it would make possible the destruction of a municipal corporation, or at least a part thereof, by another municipal corporation for its convenience and
economy."
40. Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 N.E.2d 557 (1962).
41. Ibid. (5-2 decision).
42. Id. at 351, 182 N.E.2d at 562. The distinction made by the majority opinion between
condemnation for proprietary purposes and condemnation for governmental purposes was
sharply criticized by the dissent: "Such a criterion [the criterion of paramount need), in my
opinion, is eminently more desirable than further perpetuating the already over-extended
differentiation between governmental and proprietary functions of a municipality." Id. at
354, 182 N.E.2d at 563 (dissenting opinion).
43. Id. at 352, 182 N.E.2d at 562, citing 2 McQuILLIN, MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 32.67 (3d ed. 1950). It is not clear when the necessity may arise "from the nature of
things over which the corporation has no control." Would this test be met if the city had
built an airport on the land already condemned and then at some later date, desiring to extend
the runway across a village street to accommodate jet planes, could show that it would not
be economically feasible to build a new jet airport in a better location?
39.
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thorized appropriation proceeding "is a matter of strict right, not of equit-

able discretion." 4
Zoning
Shaker Coventry Corp. v.Shaker Heights Bd. of Zoning Appeals45
presented, as an underlying issue, the problem of whether the exercise by
one municipality of its zoning regulation power may affect the power of
another municipality to zone land within its boundaries.
Shaker Boulevard is a main artery which runs westerly through
Shaker Heights and Cleveland and in the center of which is located a
rapid transit line. On the west side of the Shaker Heights-Cleveland
boundary line along Shaker Boulevard the land is zoned by the City of
Cleveland for high-rise apartments. On the east side of the boundary
the land is zoned by the City of Shaker Heights for single family and
duplex residences. A rapid transit station with a concession stand and a
small service station adjacent to it is located on the boundary.
In 1947 Shaker Coventry Corporation purchased a parcel of land
comprising several sublots which were bisected by the boundary line. On
the sublot west of the boundary, in Cleveland, the owner constructed a
high rise apartment. Then the owner applied for a building permit to
construct a high-rise apartment on the sublots to the east in Shaker
Heights. The permit was refused and the owner appealed to the Shaker
Heights Board of Zoning Appeals. The board rejected the appeal asserting that it had no jurisdiction because, under the city zoning code, it had no
authority to grant a variance in this case.
On further appeal, the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County
held that the restrictive zoning ordinance, as applied to the property proposed for a high-rise apartment was arbitrary and unreasonable.4" Three
considerations apparently determined the court's decision: (1) the nature
of the property, now a vacant lot and likely to remain so in the court's
view as long as its use was restricted to single family and duplex resi44. But cf. Village of Richmond Heights v. Board of County Comm'rs, 112 Ohio App. 272,
166 N.E.2d 143 (1960), appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St. 449, 172 N.E.2d 133 (1961).
However, the dissent in Village of Richmond Heights was in accord with the majority
view of the supreme court in Blue Ash. Id. at 288-90, 166 N.X.2d at 154-56. The Village
of Richmond Heights case involved an action to enjoin the county from condemning land to
build an airport which land was purchased by the municipality for the purpose of using it
as a site for municipal buildings and a village recreational park. The Cuyahoga County Court
of Appeals refused to grant the injunction. In this case the county sought to condemn land
which at the time was still vacant under a statute authorizing counties to construct airports.
Omo RE . CODE §§ 307.20, 719.01(0).
45. 115 Ohio App. 472, 180 N.B.2d 27, appeal dismissed, 173 Ohio St. 572, 184 N.E.2d
212 (1962).
46. Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights Planning Comm'n, Civil No. 735,845, C.P.
Ohio, March 24, 1961.
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dences; 47 (2) the nature of the property adjoining to the west and the
ready access of public transportation; and (3) the fact that the Board of
Zoning Appeals had refused Shaker Coventry a hearing on its application
for a variance.4" The decision by the common pleas court was affirmed
by the court of appeals.49
The assertion by Shaker Heights in its brief in support of a motion
to certify to the supreme court," recalls the language of the Village of
Euclid v.Ambler Realty Co.: '
But the village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a
separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern
itself as itsees fit within the limits of the organic law of its creation
and the State and Federal Constitutions. Its governing authorities, presumably representing a majority of its inhabitants and voicing their will,
have determined, not that industrial development shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course of such development shall proceed within
definitely fixed lines. If it be a proper exercise of the police power to
relegate industrial establishments to localities separated from residential
sections, itis not easy to find a sufficient reason for denying the power
because the effect of its exercise is to divert an industrial flow from
the course which it would follow, to the injury of the residential public
52
if left alone, to another course where such injury will be obviated.

If the phrase "industrial establishments" were replaced by the phrase
"apartment houses," the language of the United States Supreme Court
would aptly apply to the problem raised in the instant case.58
EDWARD R. BROWN
47. At the trial there was testimony to the contrary. One builder testified that if the
property were for sale, he would be willing to purchase it and construct a duplex residence
on it. Brief for Appellees-appellants, p. 7, Shaker Coventry Corporation v. Shaker Heights
Board of Zoning Appeals, 115 Ohio App. 472, 180 N.E.2d 27, appeal dismissed, 173 Ohio
St. 572, 184 N.E.2d 212 (1962).
48. One of the arguments made by Shaker Heights to the court was that since the zoning
board of appeals had no authority to hear the case and since this was not an independent
action but rather an appeal from an administrative agency under OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2506.01-.04, the reviewing court had no authority or jurisdiction to hear the case either. See
Broad-Miami Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 185 N.E.2d 76 (Ohio C.P. 1959), wherein
it was stated in dictum: "Turning now to the merits, the first question involved is whether
the Board had the authority to grant the variance requested; for if of course the Board had
no such authority, it would mean that this Court, on appeal, would have no such authority."
Id. at 81.
49. Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 115 Ohio App. 472,
180 N.E.2d 27, appeal dismissed, 173 Ohio St. 572, 184 N.E.2d 212 (1962).
50. Shaker Heights asserted in its brief: "In the present case the district boundary line is
the boundary line of the city itself. The City of Shaker Heights has no voice in the zoning
within the City of Cleveland. Yet the result of the decision below is that the City of Cleveland by its zoning and the Appellee by constructing an apartment building in Cleveland have
had a great deal to say about the zoning in Shaker Heights." Brief for Appellees-appellants,
p. 19, ibid.

51. 272 U.S.365 (1926).
52. Id. at 389-90.
53. For a further discussion of this aspect of the Shaker Coventry Corp. case, see Crawford,
Home Rule and Land Use Control, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 702, 720 (1962).

